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Looking Beyond the Obvious: Rethinking the December 2025 Exegy Security Incident

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Part of seriesExegy
Looking Beyond the Obvious: Rethinking the December 2025 Exegy Security Incident

Sometimes, examining an incident from a different perspective can raise questions that are worth exploring.

I've been reflecting on the December 2025 security incident at Exegy, particularly the fact that I was identified to authorities as a person of interest. One aspect of the timeline has continued to make me think about the circumstances surrounding the incident.

If someone were deliberately planning to access a company's network, wouldn't the time of year be an important consideration?

For example, the weeks between Christmas and New Year's Day can present a very different operational environment for many organizations. This is traditionally a period when employees take extended time off, departments operate with reduced staffing, and activity across the business slows considerably.

It is also a time when many employees historically used their remaining PTO before it expired. While Exegy has since moved to an unlimited PTO model, I would imagine the holiday period still brings reduced staffing, particularly given that the company's recognized holidays are limited to Christmas Day and New Year's Day.

There is another consideration: customer change freezes. During this period, customers often restrict production changes, which can further reduce normal operational activity and the volume of work being performed.

Having previously been in the office during this time of year, I remember how noticeably quiet things could become. Operations staffing was often considerably lighter, and much of the organization was away for the holidays.

From an investigative perspective, that raises an interesting question about opportunity and timing. A period with fewer employees actively monitoring operations, reduced business activity, and limited customer changes could potentially offer someone with sufficient access and technical familiarity a much longer window to explore a network without attracting the same level of attention.

That leads me to another question worth considering: When identifying potential persons of interest, how thoroughly were individuals within the organization evaluated?

Employees with established access, institutional knowledge, familiarity with internal processes, and an understanding of how information moves throughout the company may have a very different level of opportunity and insight than someone who is no longer part of the organization.

I don't raise these questions to suggest that any particular individual was responsible. Rather, I think a thorough examination of any security incident should consider all reasonable possibilities, including the operational environment at the time, the availability of personnel, access privileges, and the people who had the greatest familiarity with the systems involved.

Sometimes, the most useful questions are the ones that encourage us to look beyond the first explanation and examine whether all relevant possibilities received the same level of scrutiny.

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